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Slovak Reform of Health Care: 
From Fees to Systemic Changes
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Although most of thereform changes do not have clear winners in theshort
term (direct expenditures by patients are increasing, while revenues of
strong interest groups are declining), many partial steps bring forth almost
immediate palpable improvements that are important for gaining and main-
taining trust of the society. Typical for its fast commercialization of the
sector, Slovakia’s health care reform draws the attention of other countries.
In this paper we briefly describe initial conditions of the reform, its rea-
sons, a brief theoretical background, stabilization measures adopted and
systemic measures proposed. In the conclusion we offer an assessment of
the early impacts of the reform, and experience of its makers.
1. Introduction
1.1 Allocation of Health Care Resources
Every society decides how much of its scarce resources shall be allocated
to providing health care. OECD countries spend on average 8.4 % of their
GDPs (OECD, 2003a) on health care, of which 72 % constitute public 
expenditures. Slovak health care expenditure in the volume of 7.0 % of
the GDP is lower compared to the OECD average, yet higher than the ave-
rage of the seven new EU member states at 6.7 % of their GDPs.1 The situ-
ation gets worse when it comes to utilizing private resources: while in Slo-
vakia these constitute only 11 % of the overall costs, in other new EU states
it is as much as 27 % (Figure 1). Since health care expenditures in general
grow faster than GDP,2 it seems obvious that maintaining the current ra-
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1 Seven new EU member countries on average spend 6.7 % of their GDPs, of which 73 % are
from public sources (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slove-
nia). EU-15 states spend on average 8.1 % of GDPs, of which 78 % come from public sources.
(World Health Organization, 2003).
2 Average health care costs in OECD reached 7.3 % GDP in 1990 and 8.4 % in 2001. Average
annual GDP growth in 1989–99 was 2.0 %, while average health expenditure growth reached
3.3 %. In 1999–2001, the trend was even more distinct: 2.5 % GDP growth and 4.0 % health
care expenditure growth (OECD, 2003b).tio between public and private resources would result in cutting funds for
other public services.
The goal of the health care policy is the fair and financially sustainable
distribution of health services. Fair distribution is considered to be either
a mechanism that would provide health care to everyone according to his
or her income, or such that would provide care according to everyone’s needs.
A mechanism is considered financially sustainable provided it respects gi-
ven budget constraints, does not create conditions for the systematic accu-
mulation of debt, and complies with priorities of citizens.
Setting social priorities in health care is complicated in the political, tech-
nical and ethical aspect; however, the principal complication is the presence
of strong interest groups in the system. Defining publicly-funded diagnoses
(diseases) could be approached from three different angles:
1. According to the seriousness of the disease (e.g. the Oregon Model)
2.  According to the urgency of the need to provide health care (see e.g.
the system of waiting lists as in the United Kingdom)
3. According to the age of the patient (see e.g. (Callahan, 1994))
In the first system, diagnoses are listed according to their seriousness,
social priority or economical requirements – there is a list of priority diag-
noses. Patients pay for those diagnoses that are not funded by public sources.
Fairness of the system is based on the guarantee of equal care for equal
needs, and different care for different needs. The system supports high so-
lidarity with chronic, financially demanding or uninsurable diseases. On
the other hand, in less severe diseases the responsibility is transferred di-
rectly to the patients.
In the second system, waiting lists are created. Urgent cases are treated
first, based on the availability of public funds. This system was unofficially
in place in Slovakia. Its serious drawback is the piling up of unperformed
procedures, meaning the system is financially unsustainable. As for fair-
ness, the system is easily manipulated by corruption and unclear rules for
making placements on the lists.
The third system differentiates according to the age of the patient and
assumes various packages for different age groups of citizens. From an ethi-
cal point of view it is based on the assumption that in every age of life, one
is entitled to a different health care package, while health care-related costs
increase with age. Theprinciple of age-based packages presumes that theex-
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Public             Privatetent of fully reimbursed health care decreases with age, and focuses more
on symptomatic treatment than on removing the cause of the disease. There
is a high level of fairness of health care distribution, since everyone who
lived into old age lived so long thanks to health care provided in their youth,
when one was fully entitled to health care reimbursements. This system is
also supported by the utilitarianism principle that prefers higher health-
-related benefits calculated as years lived in full health. It thus prefers sa-
ving a younger life over an older life.
2. Expectations and Options: Reasons for the Reform
The socialist health care system offered its services free of charge. How-
ever, patients were constantly under-treated and deprived of the latest ad-
vances in pharmacological technologies, diagnostics and treatment. A net-
work of physically available, yet inefficient hospitals was built. Excess
demand was balanced by nepotism and corruption.
At the present time, treatment in Slovakia has already become more ef-
fective. This is shown by a significant growth in the mean life expectancy
(Table 1): over 1990–2002, the annual growth was 0.18 years for females
(in 1960–90 only 0.10 years annually) and 0.27 years for males (previously
–0.04 years annually).
This improvement was driven mainly by increased expenditures on new
technologies and pharmaceuticals, because no significant structural chan-
ges on the supply side of the system happened in 1990–2001. Nobody had
the courage to change the inefficient structure of the supply and relation-
ships within the system (PaÏitn˘ – Zajac, 2001), (PaÏitn˘ – Zajac, 2002).
The inherited structure of the health care system has, however, became fi-
nancially unsustainable, due to the ageing of population, spreading of non-
infectious3 and chronic diseases, the development of new, more expensive
technologies, and increasing expectations of patients. The reform thus be-
came unavoidable.
Thanks to the wide extent of free health care – Scheme 1 – excess 
of the demand was induced by existing capacity on the supply side, while
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TABLE 1 Mean Life Expectancy and Average Growth in Mean Life Expectancy per annum
1960 1970 1980 1990 2001 2002
Mean life expectancy  males 67.70 66.73 66.75 66.64 69.51 69.86
at birth females 72.47 72.92 74.25 75.44 77.54 77.63
Average growth in mean  males .. –0.10 0.00 –0.01 0.29 0.03
life expectancy per annum females .. 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.01
Source: (Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic 2003)
3 Noninfectious diseases such as cardiovascular (53 % in Slovakia) and oncological (23 %) di-
seases. According to the World Bank (2003), Slovakia is increasingly less capable of managing
health-related problems of industrialized countries.the demand as well as the supply exceeded available resources (Evans,
2001):
SUPPLY > FINANCIAL RESOURCES < DEMAND
The health care system used to pride itself for providing a high level of
equality in access to care, which was, furthermore, delivered for free. In re-
ality, none of these were true. Disequilibrium on the market was corrected
by corruption and nepotism, which further deepened inequalities (OECD,
2002b). On the level of the system, no charges to patients resulted in in-
creasing debts (Table 2) and prolonging waiting periods.
If public finances are not capable of covering the actual costs of health
care, it is possible to react on the revenue side by increasing private 
financing (co-payments by patients via private insurance and cash pay-
ments), on the supply side by increasing system efficiency, and on the de-
mand side by lowering expectations, patients have from the publicly fi-
nanced the health care system.
Politically, a health care system reform is a complex issue because in
the short-term there are no clear winners: patients lose free health care,
providers of health care are deprived of soft budget constraints, and pro-
ducers of technologies and pharmaceuticals lose part of their market.
3. The Slovak Health Care Reform
The reform aims to lower the expectations of citizens associated with
the health care system, and to strengthen their responsibility for their own
health. From the public finance perspective, it means the introduction of
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SCHEME 1 Position of Political Decisions in Health Care System Reform
Source: according to (PaÏitn˘ – Zajac, 2002)
Initial conditions
1. Improper health care
    paradigm
2. Inherited extensive supply
3. System highly
    undercapitalized
Trends
1. Population ageing
2. Development of new
    technologies
3. Expansion of noninfectious
    diseases
Challenges
1. Higher expectations
    by citizens
2. Increasing costs
3. Limited financial
    resources of citizens
Reactions
1. Lowering citizen
    expectations
2. Increasing system efficiency
3. Mobilizing resources –
    patient co-paymentsa clearly defined system in three categories: fully covered, partially covered
and non-covered health care.
The reform is based on the following assumptions:
– Moral hazard. Free health care discourages clients from investing in their
health. A health care system can influence the health status of the popu-
lation by only one quarter. Further factors include lifestyle, biological 
factors (genetics) and the environment. Patients must take care of their
health by themselves.4
– The present coverage of care is not sustainable. There is a significant fi-
nancial imbalance in the system (both the demand and supply exceed
available resources). The consequences are the accumulation of debts,
compromised quality and growth of corruption.
– Soft budget constraints dominate the system. The government guarantees
the solvency of health care insurance companies and providers. Bailouts
proved inefficient.5 There is over-employment of health care personnel.6
The system lacks competition and the private sector is discriminated.
– The whole sector is managed by physicians. Thus utilizing even basic ma-
nagement tools like strategic management, change management, finan-
cial and economical planning, and health care technology management is
still quite rare (The World Bank, 2001).
– There are logical errors in the system. For instance, a physician is obliged
to provide health care, a citizen has the right to receive it free of charge,
yet an insurer is not obliged to pay for it.7
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TABLE 2 Economic Position of the Health Care System
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e 2004f 2005f
Revenues (% GDP) 7.0 6.9 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.6
Expenditures (% GDP) 7.6 7.6 6.9 7.3 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.6
Deficit (% GDP) –0.6 –0.7 –0.5 –0.9 –0.9 –0.6 –0.4 –0.1 0.0
Debt (SKK billion)
Sources from privatization 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.4 0.0 0.0
One-time settling of debts 13.8 14.8
New debts 4.2 5.6 4.4 4.4 4.2 3.1 0.0 –11.8 –14.8
Debt, cumulative
(SKK billion)
Sources from privatization 3.5 6.9 10.5 13.9 13.9 13.9
One-time settling of debts 13.8 28.6
Debt Total  4.9 10.5 14.9 19.3 23.5 26.6 26.6 14.8 0.0
Source: Ministry of Finance of SR; Ministry of Health of SR; calculations by authors
Notes: Revenues and expenditures in 2004 and 2005 reach relatively lower shares of GDP also thanks to a high
growth rate of Slovak economy. We expect that in the longer term, revenues and expenditures shall return
to the 7 % of GDP level. (e = expectations; f = forecast)
4 To compare, in Slovak survey 61 % agreed with this, yet as many as 35 % respondents claimed
that the state and the Ministry of Health should take care of their health (Focus, 2004).
5 See also (OECD, 2002a).
6 High number of physicians is not only a burden for the health care system, but it also pre-
sents a risk of driving artificial demand (The World Bank, 2002).– The system is unable to react to the changing structure of diseases.
The goals of the reform are:
– Creating an environment supportive to incentive mechanisms to impro-
ving the health of the population. Increasing the safety of treatment and
trust of patients in the health care system.
– – Position of the state shifts from a health care services producer,
a price maker, a network manager and a distributor of finances to
the position of a regulator.
– – A patient, as an individual owner of a health commodity, takes over
higher responsibility for her or his own health status, including co-
vering some prevention as well as treatment costs.
– – The provider takes over higher responsibility for correct provision
and quality of health care, including the possible risk of penalties.
– – Ahealth care insurer takes over responsibility especially for the ma-
nagement of patients within the system, and solvency in purchasing
health care complying with hard budget constrains, with the risk of
facing bankruptcy.
– Maintaining balanced financing of the health care system.
– Increasing the flexibility of the health care system that would respond to
the needs of citizens, changing environment, shifts in structures of di-
seases, and technological progress.
– Providing financial protection of individuals from so-called catastrophic
expenses on health care.
The reform consists of stabilizing and systemic measures:
– The goal of the stabilizing measures is to stop the accumulation of debts
and limit excessive consumption of health care services and pharmaceu-
ticals. While theannual number of physician consultations in OECD coun-
tries was 5.6, the number in Slovakia was 9.2.8 According to estimates by
the Slovak Ministry of Health, 41 tons of prescribed and unused drugs
are wasted each year.
– The goal of systemic measures is to create a new system for providing
health care that would be fair and financially sustainable.
3.1 Stabilizing Measures
Stabilizing measures consisted of introducing fees, changes in pharma-
ceutical policies and pilot projects of hospital restructuring. To start any
changes it was first of all necessary to create a modern definition of the term
“health care” and define relevant services (food, lodging and transporta-
tion).
The second new element was the introduction of payments for physician
consultations, for issuing prescriptions, and providing related services start-
ing on June 1, 2003. This step increases the responsibility of patients for
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7 For instance, excessive number of patients for specialists, or not contracted surgeries of in-
-patients.
8TheOECD figure is for 2000 (OECD, 2003b). TheSlovak figure is anestimate based on thenum-
ber of visits by out-patients covered by the General Health Care Insurance in 2003.their own health by financial co-payment9, and is not intended to secure ad-
ditional resources into the system. Payments are of a symbolic nature
(SKK 20 per physician consultation and SKK 50 per one day stay in a hos-
pital), while certain groups of patients are exempt. Poor patients first paid
lower fees; however, this proved to be administratively complicated; exemp-
tions were thus canceled and the poor receive a monthly contribution for
health care of SKK 50 per household member to compensate for health ex-
penses.
The third stabilizing measure focused on pharmaceutical policy changed
composition of the categorizing commission and definition of pharmaceuti-
cals (these are currently defined based on active ingredients in 122anatomic
and therapeutic groups), and fixed the portion of the cost paid by patients
for partially reimbursed drugs. New administrative procedures of the cate-
gorizing commission increased transparency, standards and flexibility in
the pharmaceutical policy.
De-nationalization of selected hospitals (by their decentralization) made
their restructuring faster. At the same time, big hospital complexes in two
large cities Bratislava and Ko‰ice were consolidated, resulting in the sale
of several buildings. The Ministry expects the stabilizing measures to bring
an annual savings of SKK 4 billion, especially by reducing induced exces-
sive demand (Table 3).
3.2 Systemic Measures
The goal of systemic (or concept-focused) measures is to create a new sys-
tem of providing health care, fair in distributing health care commodities
and financially sustainable in the long-term. Unlike in other areas of pub-
lic finances, there is no list of best practices for health care. Therefore, this
concept has to be innovatory, and its introduction is being closely watched
by many countries.
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TABLE 3 Estimated Efficiency of Stabilizing Measures in 2003 (in SKK billion)
Measure Effective Estimate of Savings 
in 2003
Decentralization and establishment of NGOs January 1.3
New definition of health care and introducing fees 
for physician consultations and pharmaceuticals June 2.3
Introducing amendments to contracts of hospital directors October 0.1
Restructuring hospitals in Bratislava and Košice October 0.1
Pharmaceutical policy November 0.2
Total 4.0
Source: (Slovak Republic Ministry of Health, 2003)
9 The fees work similarly like co-payments in any other insurance to reduce the risk of moral
hazard. In future, significant incentives to patients could be provided by declining contribution
load. Some social groups and diagnoses are exempted (Law Nr. 98/1995).The new system contains first of all definitions of insurance, insurance
companies, providers, health care, and the basic package of care (Scheme 2).
The hottest political debate was initiated by the question of constitutional
compatibility of the law on the extent of health care covered by public health
insurance, and on compensation of services related to theprovision of health
care.
3.2.1 Health Care Insurance
The basic function of health care insurance is to create a package of re-
sources based on solidarity – this is inevitable to ensure the so-called col-
lective risk: in a great part of the population, insured events have already
occurred and they are not insurable under market bases (or insurable for
the sum that is equal to costs of treating the disease). Public health care
insurance is based on these principles:
– Universality and solidarity. Every citizen has equal access to equal needs,
and is entitled to have the need satisfied in an equal way regardless of
one’s social standing or income.
– Financed from public sources that are collected on an obligatory princi-
ple and redistributed on the solidarity principle. The Health Care Su-
pervision Authority shall supervise the distribution of the funds. Effec-
tive rate of redistribution shall reach 85.5 %.
– Every insured person is guaranteed free choice of the health care insu-
rance company, which cannot refuse insurance to anybody.
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SCHEME 2 System of Health Care
Explanations: ⇑ illustrates financial flows, ↑ illustrates permissions and licenses
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⇒– Contributions of 14 % are linear up to a given ceiling (three times the ave-
rage wage) and then regressive. The state pays insurance for vulnerable
groups of 4 % of average wage.10
– Introducing contributions paid on the basis of an annual income estab-
lishes equality between the self-employed and employees and prevents
abuse.
– The environment is competitive for all players on the health care market.
Individual health care insurance allows the reimbursement of treatments
that are not paid from public health care insurance (Box 1). Indivi-
dual health care insurance is the product that shall be offered by commer-
cial insurance companies. These will be supervised by the Financial Mar-
ket Authority.
3.2.2 Health Care Insurance Companies and Supervision Authority
The goal is to introduce hard budget constraints, transparent financial
relationships and transfer responsibility for patient management onto
health care insurers. Health care insurance is entrusted to licensed enti-
ties of private law (joint-stock companies). Profits and its use are a matter
of the insurers – however, if there are waiting lists in place, 50 % of the pro-
fits must be used for the benefit of those on the waiting list. The state has
the option of providing public health care insurance by a public insurance
company.
Health care insurance companies (HICs) that provide public health care
insurance and health care providers will be supervised by the Health Care
Supervision Authority11. The Authority shall be funded by contributions
from HICs.
The new legislation is focused on:
– Higher competitiveness and introducing market rules in operation with
health care insurance and provision. Currently, health care providers
claim finances from HICs for services provided, regardless of their quali-
ty, efficiency or competitiveness. Patient management shall bring about
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BOX 1 Conditions for Development of Individual Health Care Insurance
1. Clear definition of solidarity package financed from public sources.
2. Insurability of risks: an insured event has not happened yet.
3. Wide enough base of diagnoses and insurees to enable good distribution of the risk.
10 Roughly two fifths of the population (economically active) creates two thirds of resources in
the system; while the state creates the remaining one third for the remaining three fifths of
people. Growth of employment could help public finances and the health care sector – a 1% em-
ployment growth results in a 1.24% increase in insurance revenues.
11 The Authority monitors adherence to public health care insurance standards, and the extent
and quality of health care; it shall issue licenses and supervise solvency and performance by in-
surers. Solvency, i.e. the ratio of own resources of insurance companies and revenues from in-
surance after redistribution, cannot fall under 3 %. The Authority may issue fines and order
a remedy plan, forced administration or liquidation of insurance companies.higher competitiveness and change in payment mechanisms – with focus
on individual cases, not on services provided.
– The selection of providers, while respecting the minimum network and
quality standards, together with introducing more up-to-date payment
mechanisms shall be the principal tools of competition. HICs shall not
compete in collecting contributions for public insurance, but in the effi-
cient purchasing of health care. We presume that managed care will ap-
pear, as well as organizations similar to HMO.
– Clear rules for handling finances for health care to avoid inefficient and
discriminatory behavior of HICs towards health care providers. Non-pub-
lic HICs are able, under equal legislative conditions and with an identi-
cal structure of insured persons, reach balanced budgets.
– Higher competition of providers that provide insured persons with care
ordered by HICs. The performance of providers is currently not influenced
by the market, but by the ability of the management to obtain money for
operation from HICs – regardless of use of existing capacity, labor effi-
ciency, structure of employees or operating costs.
– Defining the role of the state which is to formulate the health care policy,
to regulate and to control.
3.2.3 Health Care Providers
The goal is to increase the decision-making autonomy and responsibility
of health care providers. At the same time, the controlling and supervisory
function of the state is strengthened. The new system is based on several
principles:
– When licensing, eliminate artificial barriers to entry erected by profes-
sional chambers.
– Introduce new types of health care providers, like providers of one-day
care, and houses of custodian care.
– Regulate the number, position and tasks of professional organizations in
health care. Compulsory registration and membership of all health care
professionals in chambers as thecondition for practice shall be abandoned.
However, at the same time compulsory registration with the Supervisory
Authority is being introduced to ensure continuous retention and renewal
of professional competence.
– The public network of health care providers shall be defined by insurance
companies, and a network of licensed employees by chambers. Providers
shall sign contracts directly with HICs that must observe the condition
of a minimal availability of health care as for geographic, demographic
and other situations.12 The Supervisory Authority, or other government
authorities in the area of health care, shall monitor whether HICs ob-
serve the pre-defined minimum number of health care providers.
–  There will be contract-based and other providers functioning within
the system. While a contract-based provider will settle the cost directly
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12 Minimum availability is defined by the Ministry of Health care in the form of a minimum
public network of health care providers.with HICs and the patient only paying a fixed fee (SKK 20 or 50), other
providers will charge costs directly to patients. Following a prior consul-
tation, the patient may ask HICs for reimbursement, but only up to
the amount of usual costs.
– The transformation of health care facilities that have existed as contri-
butory state organizations to joint-stock companies. Facilities should be
decentralized to municipalities, districts, regions and other entities.
3.2.4 Health Care
Health care is defined as, provided health care, forms of providing health
care, rights and obligations resulting from its provision, handling health
care records and relevant services. Health care is provided in the correct
manner if a correct diagnosis is made without undue delay, and the correct
preventive or therapeutic treatment is provided.
3.2.5 Extent of Health Care Covered from Public Health Insurance
The extent proposed is derived from the principle that an insured person
has the right to equal care in case of equal needs. Due to the infinite na-
ture of needs it is however necessary to define a certain maximum extent
of care – a flexible basic package – based on the list of priorities.13
The presently applied “silent” rationing is becoming aserious ethical prob-
lem and source of corruption. Decision making is done on a micro-level sys-
tem, i.e. by physicians. The solution would be to replace it by explicit ra-
tioning, i.e. define clear and transparent rules binding for every participant
in the system while respecting medical, ethical and economical criteria;
while the quality of health care must be maintained.
Definition of priorities is calculated by three mechanisms:
1. The mechanism of defining the priority list of covered diseases. The pri-
ority list is a positive list of diagnoses where there is zero co-payment of
insured patients and the patient only pays for services connected with
the treatment (SKK 20 or 50). Other diagnoses not listed could be co-paid
by patients. However, this will only concern the treatment itself, not dia-
gnostics. The list of priority diagnoses shall be adopted by Parliament
based on a proposal by the Government.
2. Mechanism of cataloging. All diseases shall be subject to the process of
cataloging where they would be assigned a list of interventions fully re-
imbursed from public health care insurance. Standard diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures are thus created. The Catalog shall be compiled
by the cataloging commission (predominantly physicians) nominated by
the Minister of Health.
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13 similar to the US state of Oregon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United
Kingdom3. Mechanism of categorization. For diseases not listed on the priority list,
categorization shall determine the extent of patient co-payment for in-
terventions. The categorizing commission (predominantly economists)
shall be nominated by theMinister of Health. Theprincipal goal of thede-
fined criteria for categorizing interventions and pharmaceuticals is to
provide the maximum effect under the most efficient conditions.
The list of priority diseases contains approximately 6,700 diagnoses,
which is almost two thirds of the total list of diagnoses (11,000) listed in
ICD 1014. Provided constant prices and demand, patients would pay in to-
tal almost SKK 3 billion, which creates a market for individual insurance
in commercial HICs (Table 4). The average co-payment of individually unin-
sured patients per diagnosis would reach at most SKK 200.
4. Conclusion
Reforming the health care system requires to have a clear concept and to
execute a number of detailed steps, the description of which is beyond
the scope of this article. Yet even immediate changes in management could
lead to substantial savings and improved care. However, any concept could
not be successful without the public and subsequently political support. Al-
though the majority of changes do not have clear winners in the short term
(direct expenditures by patients are increasing, while revenues of strong
interest groups are declining), many partial steps bring forth almost im-
mediate palpable improvements that are important to win and retain
the public trust.
The introduction of fees led to a 10% decline in visits to general practi-
tioners, a 13% decline in emergency service calls and a transfer of in-
-patients from hospitals to other institutions (Figure 2 and 3).15 Regardless
of that, the public claims that it visits physicians as frequently as before.16
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TABLE 4 Break-down of Diagnoses to the Priority List and Others (in SKK million)
Area Diagnoses Present  % of % of  % of new New volume New volume Average
volume of  total total payments of payments of payments annual
payments   cases costs from public by HICs by patients payment by
by insurers insurance patients
I. Priority 19,990 41 67 100 19,990 0 0
II. Other 9,989 59 33 0-95 6,992 2,997 SKK 50–200*
Total 29,979 100 100 26,982 2,997
Note: * per diagnosis based on complexity
Source: HICs, calculated by the Ministry of Health care and authors
14 International Classification of Diagnoses
15 Comparison of data from the General Health Care Insurance. Since fees were introduced
starting the second half of 2003, we are comparing with the second half of 2002. The number of
all out-patient visits declined by 6 % and the number of in-patients in hospitals (and other in-
stitutions) by 1 %. When 2003 to 2002 are compared, the drop is 3 % and 1 % respectively.This means that minimum fees were able to reduce artificial demand with
no negative impact on the vulnerable. The lower number of visits could have
also been reflected in higher quality of care. Fees thus started to reduce ex-
cessive demand, while concerns about compromised availability of care
proved to be unjustified.
The introduction of fees improved cash income of physicians by SKK
7,000–9,000 per month. Payments in hospitals for food and lodging provided
patients with incentives to demand higher quality of services. The signifi-
cant immediate effect is that patients started to feel that health care is not
free of charge.17
Another likely impact of introducing fees was a drop in corruption. While
in November 2002 as many as 32 % of respondents associated health care
with corruption, in January 2004 it was only 10 %.18 There was a drop in
the frequency of providing bribes and gifts – to specialists from 18 % in sum-
mer 2002 to 14 % in the autumn 2003, and in hospitals from 14 % to 11 %
respectively over the same period.19
There was a significant reduction of the growth of pharmaceuticals. Fol-
lowing the introduction of payments for prescriptions, lower frequency of
physician visits (95 % of visits result in issuing prescriptions) and the new
categorization of pharmaceuticals, the growth of total expenditures 
on pharmaceuticals was reduced to 3 % (Box 2)20. In comparison, in
2000–2002 the average annual growth reached 10 %. While expenses on
pharmaceuticals of providers dropped down by almost 30 %, additional
payments by patients increased only by 6 %. This was caused by a gene-
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FIGURE 2 Number of Out-patient Visits            FIGURE 3 Number of Hospitalizations






















1H2002        2H2002      1H2003      2H2003
16 Polls claim a slight increase in visits to general practitioners and dentists, and slight decline
in visits to specialists and hospitals. Public opinion poll, June 2002 and October 2003.
17 61 % of respondents agree that one has to take care of one’s own health, yet 35 % think that
the state and the Ministry of Health care should primarily take care [of one’s health] (Focus,
January 2004).
18 Public opinion on health care related issues (Focus, November 2002 and January 2004).
19 Public opinion poll, June 2002 and October 2003.
20 Expenditures on pharmaceuticals by HICs dropped by 13 % in the 1Q2004.ral tendency to prescribe fewer pharmaceuticals that require co-payments,
and price cuts by pharmaceutical companies compensating for reduced de-
mands.
There was a decline in growth of indebtedness (Table 2). While in 1997– 
–2002 the new uncovered debt was growing by the average annual rate of
SKK 4.3 billion, despite injecting SKK 10.5 billion, in 2003 there was a zero
growth. The greatest success was reducing debt generation by decentrali-
zed providers and introducing a monitoring program of the efficiency of di-
rectors in large facilities. Moreover, there was a number of positive exam-
ples where transformation to non-profit organizations resulted not only in
halting the build-up of debt, but it also resulted in a budget surplus.21 These
hospitals have undergone a significant restructuring in the last 12 to
18 months and nowadays have access to commercial loans to purchase
health care technology to increase the quality of their services. The adopted
reforms and expectations created thus started to lead to stricter adherence
to budget constraints.
Transferring hospitals to municipalities and regions led to their better
monitoring and management. For instance the Trnava region found viola-
tions in several hospitals that could be classified as fraud.22 It seems that
the changes and expectations of further changes provide good incentives for
self-governments to improve public governance in hospitals.
Another important systemic change included de-politicization of activi-
ties by HICs, and imposing on them stricter budget constraints. Based on
the current legislation, the insurers started to defend their interests, 
vis-à-vis providers more efficiently and extend budget constraints on 
them.
In addition to the plan of reform changes it is also necessary to create
a study assessing the impact on different social groups. Here the reform en-
counters problems lying beyond the scope of the health care sector – low
quality of statistical data due to sample selection bias, and limited human
resources. Since reform is thus inevitably in a certain sense a step into
the unknown, it is necessary to adequately compensate vulnerable social
groups.
418 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
BOX 2 Growth of Expenditures on Pharmaceuticals, %
2000 2001 2002 2003
Insurance companies 17.9 10.5 15.9 6.4
Health care providers 9.5 4.3 –5.5 –29.4
Patients (co-payments) 6.3 –11.8 21.6 6.0
Total 15.7 7.8 13.8 2.9
Note: consolidated
Source: calculations by authors based on Ministry of Health care data
21 most significantly the Hospital Bardejov
22 See “Director of the Skalica Hospital Approved His Own Salary”, SME daily, Feb. 19, 2004.LITERATURE
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The paper summarizes recent health-care reform in Slovakia and the reform’s ge-
neral rationale, provides a brief theoretical background, and describes the reform
measures both adopted and proposed. The authors assess the early experience and
the impact of the undertaken reform.
The main feature of Slovak health-care reform has been the commercialization of
the sector. While much of the reform is still in process, and is thus hard to quantify
(for instance, direct expenditures by patients are increasing, while the revenues of
certain interest groups are declining), many early steps have produced concrete im-
provements important toward securing social legitimacy.
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